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Using  data  from  Italian  municipal  elections  from  1993  to  2011,  we  investigate  whether  political 
competition  affects  electoral  turnout.  Taking  advantage  of  the  dual  ballot  system  adopted  for 
municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, we measure the expected closeness in the second 
round through the first round electoral results. Thanks to the richness of our dataset we are able to 
distinguish between valid, blank and invalid ballots and to investigate the effect of closeness on each 
of these variables, controlling for municipalities’ and candidates’ characteristics and for municipal 
fixed effects. We also estimate a Heckman selection model to take into account for the non-randomly 
selected sample. It emerges that closeness strongly increases valid ballots and reduces blank ballots 
supporting the idea that the expected benefits of voting increase in closer competitions. The effect is 
much higher in magnitude than that merging when measuring closeness with ex-post electoral results, 
suggesting a quite relevant endogeneity bias.  On the other hand, we do not find any statistically 
significant effect on invalid ballots. 
 
 
JEL classification: D72, D78; J45 




Participation at elections is crucial for well-functioning political systems. Understanding the reasons that 
lead people to vote in large elections is of major interest both for political scientists and for economists.  
Scholars have considered different factors that may induce individuals to vote, such as the utility 
deriving from the election of the voter’s favorite candidate, weighted by the probability of being the 
decisive voter (“instrumental voting”), and the benefits deriving from expressing political preferences or 
solidarity,  or  the  desire  to  contribute  to  the  functioning  of  democracy  and  to  fulfill  a  civic  duty 
(“expressive voting”) (see Dhillon and Peralta, 2002; Feddersen, 2004). 
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Among  the  factors  affecting  turnout,  the  degree  of  electoral  competition  is  one  of  the  most 
investigated, under the theoretical  assumption  that a  closer  electoral  race  stimulates  greater  electoral 
participation.  
However, disentangling the effects of electoral competition on turnout and trying to investigate 
through which channels it works is a challenging task. Typically, electoral competition is measured using 
ex-post election results to proxy for electors’ ex-ante expectations of closeness (Cox and Munger 1989; 
Matsusaka  and  Palda,  1993;  Geys,  2006).  This  poses  serious  endogeneity  problems.  Suppose,  for 
example,  that  a  positive  shock,  due  to  an  unobservable  factor,  affects  votes  obtained  by  a  certain 
candidate: this has an impact on turnout and on the electoral margin, determining a correlation between 
the error term and the variable of interest and leading to biased estimates.  
In this paper we rely on elections held using a dual ballot system and measure the expected 
electoral  closeness  at  the  second  round  with  the  actual  closeness  at  the  first  round.  To  analyze  the 
relationship between electoral closeness and turnout we consider about 1,400 electoral competitions at the 
municipal level taking place in Italy from 1993 to 2011. Since 1993, for cities with more than 15,000 
inhabitants, elections are held using a dual ballot system. If none of the candidates obtains the majority of 
the votes, the two leading candidates at the first round compete in the second ballot, which takes place 
two weeks later. This structure allows us to proxy expected closeness at the second round with the actual 
closeness at the first round, given the short time span intervening among the two rounds. 
Compared to existing works exploiting French and Hungarian general elections (Fauvelle-Aymar 
and  Francois,  2006;  Indridason,  2008;  Simonovits,  2011),  we  take  advantage  of  some  institutional 
features  of  the  Italian  electoral  system.  Firstly,  our  study  is  based  on  independent  elections  (each 
municipality  elects  its  own  mayor  and  no  interdependence  exists  among  municipalities),  while  the 
literature exploiting dual ballot systems refers to political elections in which voters could be affected in 
the second round by the general tendency at the national level. Secondly, in Italy only two candidates 
compete  in  the  second  round  allowing  for  a  clear  definition  of  the  electoral  margin,  while  in  other 
countries typically all the candidates obtaining more than a certain threshold of votes (for example, 12.5% 
in France) go to the second round, making ambiguous the definition of the electoral margin. Thirdly, we 
are able to use a Heckman selection model to handle estimation problems deriving from a non-randomly 
selected sample due to the fact that the second round only takes place if no candidate has obtained the 
majority of votes in the first round. 
A further peculiarity of our work is that, to better understand the effects of electoral competition 
on turnout, we look separately at the three different types of ballots casted by electors: valid, blank ad 
invalid ballots. While the effect of closeness on turnout is widely investigated, little is known on its effect 
on blank and invalid ballots, even if they are increasing over time.  
We  estimate  several  models  explaining  valid,  invalid  and  blank  ballots  at  the  second  round 
elections in relation to the expected closeness of that round based on the electoral results of the first 
round. In our regressions we control for the percentage of valid, invalid and blank ballots at the first 3 
 
round, a number of municipal characteristics and the average characteristics of candidates in terms of 
education, age and gender. Furthermore, exploiting the fact that typically more than one election is held in 
each municipality in the period considered (18 years), we also control for municipality fixed effects. We 
find that closeness strongly increases valid ballots and reduces blank ballots. As far as invalid ballots are 
concerned, we do not find any statistically significant effect.  
With our data we also show that the bias deriving from not taking into account the endogeneity 
problems related to the use of ex-post measures of closeness could be quite relevant. In fact, when we run 
our regressions to explain turnout measuring electoral closeness with the electoral results at the same 
round, we find that the effect of closeness on turnout is much smaller in magnitude compared to the 
unbiased estimates.  
To avoid possible biases due to sample selection we also estimate a Heckman selection model: 
the estimates substantially confirm our OLS results. We also show that our findings are robust to the use 
of an estimator fitting a proportional dependent variable (frational logit model). 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 briefly discusses the related literature. 
Section 3 is devoted to the description of the institutional framework and of our dataset. In Section 4, we 
investigate  the  effects  of  closeness  on  valid  ballots,  controlling  for  municipalities’  and  candidates’ 
characteristics and municipal fixed effects. Section 5 offers some robustness checks. In Section 6, we 
investigate the determinants of blank and invalid ballots. Section 7 explores the possibility of non-linear 
effects. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The idea that electoral participation is linked to political competition goes back to Downs (1957): under 
the  assumption  of  instrumental  behavior,  with  voters  undertaking  a  costs-benefits  analysis,  a  closer 
election is expected to induce a higher turnout since it increases the probability for each voter of being 
decisive. This was defined by Matsusaka and Palda (1993) as the “Downsian Closeness Hypothesis”.  
As argued by Cox and Munger (1989) and Shachar and Nalebuff (1999), closeness may increase 
turnout  also  because  of  a  higher  mobilization  effort  of  parties  and  candidates,  which  may  persuade 
unconvinced  voters  and  provide  useful  information  that  induce  a  number  of  previously  uninformed 
subjects to cast their vote. The greater mobilization and the higher attention and discussion that typically 
accompanies elections characterized by highly uncertain results may also increase social pressure for 
taking part to the vote. 
  Empirical works aimed at shedding light on the impact of closeness on turnout are widespread– in 
his review of the literature, Geys (2006) counts more than 50 studies on the topic – especially at the 
national level. Findings are unfortunately rather ambiguous: more than 40% of the estimates show no 
effect of closeness or even effects opposite to those expected.  4 
 
The unclear results are perhaps caused by a number of econometric problems mainly deriving 
from the fact that the closeness of the electoral competition (the explanatory variable) and the turnout at 
that competition (the dependent variable) are jointly determined. 
Only in few works, electoral competition has been measured considering previous election results 
or opinion polls. However, given the temporal distance, previous election results are typically a quite 
imprecise measure of electoral competition, while opinion polls may not reflect the effective electoral 
choices and are typically not available at the local/district level. 
Some recent works, relying on elections held using a dual ballot system, have measured the 
expected electoral competition at the second round with the actual competition at the first round. This  
strategy has been used by Fauvelle-Aymar and Francois (2006) and by Indridason (2008), who base their 
analysis on French data, and by Simonovits (2011), who focuses on the dual ballot system adopted in 
Hungary for general elections. From these studies, it emerges that a higher electoral competition (higher 
closeness) at the first round increases the turnout at the second round (both in France and Hungary). 
Our work follows a similar strategy but we look separately to valid, invalid and blank ballots. 
Blank  and  invalid  ballots  generally  represent  a  small  share  of  total  ballots,  but  their  importance  is 
increasing over time and an analysis of electoral behavior in all its components seems relevant as blank 
and invalid ballots are probably not random events. The percentage of blank and invalid ballots seem to 
be related to socio-economic and institutional factors, such as education, income and voting systems 
(Power and Garand, 2007). The degree of electoral competition may also affect this type of voter choices, 
but the relationship could be either positive or negative. On the one hand, invalid and blank ballots may 
decrease because of the higher expected benefits deriving from closeness, related both to the higher 
probability of being pivotal and to the higher costs of expressing discontent through a blank or voluntary 
invalid ballot (see Endersby, Galatas, and Rackaway, 2002; Aldashev and Mastrobuoni, 2011). On the 
other  hand,  a  positive  relationship  may  emerge  in  case  of  electors  unwilling  to  support  any  of  the 
candidates but wanting to avoid the stigma of non-voting deriving from higher social pressure. Indeed, 
when competition increases candidates' and social pressure increases leading to a higher cost of not going 
to the polls, but electors may still escape from supporting the candidates by casting a blank or invalid 
ballot. 
A part from voters’ behavior, in traditional paper-ballot systems, the number of invalid ballots is 
affected by election officers. To these subjects is, in fact, delegated the provisional decision on any 
dispute related to the vote count (disputes are ultimately decided by the Court). Again, the relationship 
between electoral closeness and invalid votes is ambiguous. In case of unbiased election officers, we 
would expect a positive correlation between invalid ballots and electoral closeness due to a higher effort 
and attention devoted in tracking the truly invalid ballots in closer electoral races. However, in case of 
biased elections officers (who cheat to favor their preferred candidate) the relationship is less clear. When 
the margin between the candidates is slim, biased election officers are, on the one hand, less likely to 5 
 
invalidate the ballots supporting their preferred candidate, but, on the other hand, they are more induced 
to invalidate the ballots against their candidate. 
  Then, understanding the relationship between electoral competition and valid, invalid and blank 
ballots is an empirical matter. Nevertheless, while there are a number of works analyzing the effect of 
electoral competition on turnout, only few empirical studies have looked at the different ballot categories. 
Galatas  (2008),  using  data  from  1999  and  2003  provincial  elections  in  Ontario,  investigates  the 
relationship between blank ballots and electoral competition, showing that blank ballots reduce in closer 
elections. Aldashev and Mastrobuoni (2011) focus instead on the relationship between the closeness of 
the electoral race and the number of invalid ballots. They use data on Italian parliamentary elections in 
years  going  from  1994  to  2001  and  find  a  strong  positive  correlation  between  the  closeness  of  the 
electoral  race and the  fraction  of  invalid  ballots. They  interpret this effect  as the result  of  unbiased 
election officers who increase their effort in response to the higher closeness of the electoral race. 
 
3. Institutional framework and data 
Italy is characterized by a quite high electoral turnout compared to many European countries and to US. 
In municipal elections the average turnout in the period 1993-2011 has been 78.8%.
1  
Municipal administrations in Italy are responsible for a number of relevant functions such as the 
management of public utilities (local roads, water, sewage, garbage collection) and the provision of some 
services having a strong impact on the daily life of citizens  (public housing and transportation, nursery 
schools etc.). As a consequence, voters are generally strongly interested in the choice of the mayor and in 
the composition of the Municipal Council. 
The system currently regulating municipal elections in Italy has been introduced in 1993 (Law no. 
81 of March 25, 1993). It has established the direct election of the mayor and the adoption of the plurality 
rule, with some differences according to the size of the city. For municipalities with a population of fewer 
than 15,000 inhabitants, elections are held with single ballot and plurality rule: the winning candidate is 
awarded a majority premium of at least two-thirds of the seats in the council. For cities with a population 
above 15,000, elections are held using a dual ballot system (where  the second ballot is held only if none 
of the candidates obtains an absolute majority of votes in the first ballot).
2  Only the two leading 
candidates at the first round compete in the second ballot  – which takes place two weeks later – and the 
winning candidate is awarded a majority premium of at least 60 percent of the seats in the council. 
This feature of the Italian municipal system allows us to proxy voters’ expected closeness at the 
second round with the actual closeness at the first round. 
                                                       
1 A similar figure has been recorded for recent Parliamentary Elections (78%). 
2 In two regions with special legislative powers, the thresholds  for the dual ballot system have been set differently. 
In Sicily, the threshold is set at 5,000 inhabitants. In Friuli Venezia Giulia until 2001 the threshold was  at 10,000 
and was set at 15,000 afterwards. We include in our sample 61 observations for the municipalities involved. 6 
 
Municipalities have a registry of eligible voters (which is revised whenever there is an election): 
all citizens aged 18 or more on the election date are automatically registered to vote. Elections usually last 
two consecutive days (Sunday and Monday). Voting takes place in polling stations organized by the local 
authorities. Elections are organized according to a traditional paper ballot system.
3 
We base our analysis on a panel dataset (collected using the information provided by the Italian 
Ministry of Internal Affairs )
4  on  1,410  municipal elections held  over the period 1993 -2011  in 632 
municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants (about  7% of Italian municipalities). The observations 
include the municipalities that over the period  considered have elected their mayor through a second 
electoral round. We have information both for the first and second round on the number of valid, invalid 
and blank ballots, the number of people eligible to vote, the number of candidates at the first round and 
the votes they received.  
In addition, we use the 1991 and 2001 Italian Census of Population to obtain data at the municipal 
level on the population size, the number of employed individuals, the educational attainment of the 
population,  the  percentage  of  people  over  the  age  of  65.   Finally,  from  the  database  on  local 
administrators, provided by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, we have collected information on the 
identity, gender, age and highest educational attainment of candidates to the mayor position  (we have 
some missing values for these controls and the number of municipal elections used in regressions 
controlling for these covariates reduces to 1,367). 
We use the information  on the results at the first round as a proxy for  the closeness of  the 
competition at the second round. More precisely, we build the variable Electoral Margin as the absolute 
difference between the number of votes obtained by the two leading candidates at the first round (divided 
by the number of eligible voters). Therefore, Electoral Margin represents an inverse measure of expected 
electoral closeness for the second round election.
5 
We define the variable Valid (II round) as the ratio between the number of valid ballots at the 
second round and the number of eligible voters.
6 Similarly, the Blank (II round)  and Invalid (II round) 
are the ratio between, respectively, blank and invalid ballots, and eligible voters. We define analogous 
                                                       
3 In each polling room there is a president, a secretary and four assistants. Each political party has the right to have a 
representative present in every polling room, who can check all the activities of the election officers. The count of 
the ballots starts as soon as the elections end. During the count each ballot paper is checked by all the six election 
officers and any of the party representatives. Ballots with any redundant writing, beyond the expression of a valid 
vote,  are considered invalid. In case of disagreement about  who to assign the vote to, the president decides a 
temporary "position" (the final decision is taken by the Court). Results of the count (valid, invalid and blank ballots) 
are reported in an official statement. 
4 See the webpage http://elezionistorico.interno.it/  (Archivio Storico delle Elezioni). 
5 We also experiment defining Electoral Margin as the absolute difference between the number of votes for the two 
leading candidates at the first round divided by the sum of votes obtained by them    2 1 2 1 / v v v v   . Results (not 
reported) are very similar to those shown in the paper. 
6 Our dependent variable Valid (II round) is slightly different from other measures of turnout used in the literature, 
since we deal separately with blank and invalid ballots, whereas they are typically included in the turnout variable. 
We investigate blank and invalid ballots determinants in Section 6. 7 
 
measures for the first round. We also consider among our controls the number of votes obtained by the 
two leading candidates at the first round (as a percentage of electors), Votes First Two Candidates 
In our main analyses, we only consider elections for which a second round was held and then 
elections for which at the first round none of the candidates obtained the absolute majority of the votes. In 
Section  5,  as  a  robustness  check,  we  estimate  a  Heckman  selection  model  considering  also  the 
municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in which no second round was held. 
In Table 1 are reported some descriptive statistics. The average Electoral Margin is equal to 
7.2%. The municipality with the closest election in our data shows a vote difference of  nearly zero 
between the two leading candidates, while in the election with the highest margin at the first round the 
best performing candidate leads by 29.3%. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  N 
Valid (II round)  0.6392  0.0785  0.3412  0.8330  1410 
Blank (II round)  0.0083  0.0059  0.0010  0.0435  1410 
Invalid (II round)  0.0154  0.0088  -0.0072  0.0951  1410 
Electoral Margin  0.0723  0.0562  0.0001  0.2932  1410 
Valid (I round)  0.7504  0.0590  0.3433  0.8934  1410 
Invalid (I round)  0.0262  0.0118  -0.0033  0.1774  1410 
Blank (I round)  0.0130  0.0096  0.0000  0.0796  1410 
Votes First Two Cand. (I round)  0.5234  0.0977  0.1974  0.8367  1410 
# Candidates  5.6752  1.9239  3  17  1410 
Population (,000)  48.6894  152.0518  5.0070  2775.2500  1410 
Education  7.3727  0.9320  4.9863  10.0206  1410 
Employment  0.3105  0.1371  0.0549  0.8045  1410 
Percentage Pop≥65  0.1452  0.0440  0.0380  0.2782  1410 
Candidates' Education  16.1291  2.2881  8  18  1369 
Candidates' Age  49.0448  7.5365  25  77  1384 
Female Candidates  0.1348  0.3417  0  1  1387 
Source: Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Italian Census 1991 and 2011. 
 
The average ratio between valid ballots and electors over the period 1993-2011 is of 75% and 
63.9%, at the first and second round, respectively. Blank ballots are 1.3% and 0.83% respectively at the 
first and second round, while invalid ballots are 2.62% at the first round and 1.54% at the second round. 
The average population size is of 48,689. The average years of education in the population are 
7.37, the ratio between the number of employed individuals and the total number of inhabitants is of 
about 31% and the share of population aged more than 65 is 14.52%. 43% of municipalities are located in 
the South and Islands. 
The average number of years of schooling of the two leading candidates is of about 16.
7 Their 
average age is about 49 years. Less than 1 4% of second round competitions have seen a female among 
competing candidates. 
                                                       
7 It takes 13 years to attain a High-School Degree while 17-18 years are necessary to attain a College Degree. 8 
 
 
4. Electoral Closeness and Turnout: OLS and fixed effect estimates 
In this Section we estimate an OLS model to analyze whether electoral closeness enhances turnout. More 
precisely, we firstly focus on the percentage of valid votes, which according to theoretical prediction 
should be positively affected by electoral closeness. We estimate the following model: 
 
  it t i it it it it it Z X W  Margin Electoral round   II   Valid                 4 3 2 1 0  
 
where   it round   II   Valid  is the ratio between valid ballots at the second round and eligible voters in 
municipality  i  at election year  t ,  it  Margin Electoral  is the difference (in absolute value) between the 
number of votes at the first round for the two leading candidates (divided by the number of eligible 
voters),  it W  is a vector including the first round electoral outcomes (the percentage of votes obtained by 
the  two  leading  candidates,  the  percentage  of  valid,  invalid  and  blank  ballots),  it X   is  a  vector  of 
municipal characteristics, such as the population size, the average years of education of inhabitants, the 
fraction  of  employed  population,  the  fraction  of  elderly  population,  it Z   is  a  vector  of  candidates’ 
characteristics such as education, age and gender, the  t   is a vector of election year dummies,  i   is a 
vector of municipal dummies (to capture unobserved geographical heterogeneity), and  it   is an error 
term. 
In  Table  2  are  shown OLS  estimates  considering  as  dependent  variable Valid  (II  round).  In 
column (1) we only consider among regressors the variable Electoral Margin and the percentage of valid 
ballots at the first round. Any observable and unobservable determinants of electoral turnout antecedent to 
the first round should be captured by the variable Valid (I round) and controlling for it should attenuate 
possible biases from omitted variables. 
From our OLS estimates, it emerges a strong and negative effect of Electoral Margin on the 
percentage of valid ballots (significant at the 1 percent level), that is, a positive effect of the expected 
closeness on electoral turnout. If the electoral margin shrinks of 10 percentage points, ceteris paribus, the 
electoral turnout at the second round increases of about 2 percentage points.  
As  expected,  Valid  (I  round)  has  a  strong  effect  on  the  turnout  at  the  second  round.  The 
coefficient is 0.88, implying a very high degree of correlation between the turnout at the first and second 
round. 
In column (2) we control for the percentage of valid, blank and invalid ballots at the first round 
and for the votes obtained by the two leading candidates at the first round. Results are very similar to 
those  reported  in  column  (1).  In  column  (3)  we  add  among  regressors  a  number  of  municipal 
characteristics in terms of population size, average education, employment rate and the percentage of 
elderly population and some candidates’ characteristics (average age, average education and a dummy for 9 
 
the presence of at least a female among candidates). Again the variable Electoral Margin at the first 
round produces a negative and highly statistically significant effect on the percentage of valid ballots.
8 
In columns (4)-(6) we run the same specifications described above, but we control for municipal 
fixed effects, since unobservable municipal traits could affect both the degree of political competition and 
the electoral turnout. In all these specifications, we find that the Electoral Margin at the first round has a 
strong and negative impact on the Turnout at the second round. 
The  coefficients  on  Electoral  Margin  are  always  highly  statistically  significant  (the  t-stat  is 
typically greater than 6 in absolute value) and quite stable across specifications. As regards the magnitude 
of the effect, we find that a decrease of 10 percentage points in the electoral margin between the two 
leading candidates increases the percentage of valid ballots of about 1.6-1.9 percentage points according 
to the specification used. In terms of standard deviations, an increase of one standard deviation in the 
electoral margin produces a reduction of about 0.13 standard deviations in the percentage of valid votes. 
Our estimated effects are in line with those found by Simonovits (2011) for general elections in 
Hungary, but much higher (about two-three times) than those highlighted for France by Fauvelle-Aymar 
(2006) and Indridason (2008). 
We  also  find  that  the  effect  of  a  closer  political  race  is  particularly  relevant  when  electoral 
participation at the first round was lower than the average. By interacting Electoral Margin with the 
variable Valid (I round) demeaned, we show that a 10 percentage points lower electoral margin leads to 
an increase in the turnout (at the second round) of about 3.2 percentage points in municipalities where 
Valid (I round) is 10 points lower than the average. On the other hand, we find that in municipalities 
where Valid (I round) is 10 points higher than the average this effect is only 1 percentage point (results 
not reported). This implies that the electoral closeness produces a strong encouraging effect particularly in 
municipalities where at the first round the electors were less prone to cast their votes. 
 
                                                       
8  We  have  also  run  separate  regressions  for  Southern  and  Northern  municipalities  to  investigate  whether  the 
relationship  between  closeness  and  turnout  is  different  in  the  two  geographical  areas  but  we  do  not  find  any 
significant difference. 10 
 
Table 2. Turnout (Valid Ballots) at the Second Round and Expected Closeness. OLS estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout 
             
Electoral Margin  -0.1937***  -0.1801***  -0.1874***  -0.1857***  -0.1620***  -0.1725*** 
  (0.0249)  (0.0234)  (0.0231)  (0.0236)  (0.0213)  (0.0216) 
Valid (I round)  0.8820***  0.7532***  0.8345***  0.7617***  0.6051***  0.5831*** 
  (0.0306)  (0.0321)  (0.0333)  (0.0456)  (0.0442)  (0.0455) 
Votes First Two Cand. (I round)    0.2032***  0.1922***    0.2092***  0.2143*** 
    (0.0161)  (0.0146)    (0.0165)  (0.0167) 
Blank (I round)    0.4682**  0.0450    0.0452  0.0903 
    (0.2057)  (0.1822)    (0.3035)  (0.3178) 
Invalid (I round)    0.1204  0.2193    0.1906  0.1764 
    (0.1607)  (0.1519)    (0.1956)  (0.1918) 
Candidates’ and Municipalities’ Controls  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Municipality Fixed Effects  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  1410  1410  1367  1410  1410  1367 
Adjusted R-squared  0.620  0.663  0.717  0.693  0.749  0.752 
Number of clusters  632  632  620  632  632  620 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio between valid ballots at the second round and eligible electors. Candidates’ controls include Candidates’ 
Education, Candidates’ Age, Female Candidates. Municipalities’ Controls include Population, Education, Employment, Percentage Pop≥65. In all 
regressions we control for year dummies. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
   
  In order to evaluate the possible bias deriving from measures of electoral closeness based on ex-
post electoral results (as typically done in the literature, see Geys, 2006), we have computed the electoral 
margin as the difference (in absolute value) between the number of votes obtained by the two candidates 
at the second round (divided by the number of eligible voters). Using this measure we have run our OLS 
regressions (exactly the same specifications reported in Table 2). 
Results reported in Table 3 show that although the impact of the electoral margin is negative and 
statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect is much smaller compared to our previous estimates, 
in which we proxy the electoral closeness with the margin at the first round. A decrease of 10 percentage 
points in the electoral margin increases the percentage of valid ballots of only 0.5-0.7 percentage points: 
the effect is about one third of the effect emerging from estimates reported in Table 2. This is arguably 
the result of the endogeneity bias deriving from the use of an ex-post measure of closeness. 
 
Table 3. Turnout (Valid Ballots) at the Second Round and Closeness at the Second Round. OLS estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout 
             
Electoral Margin (II round)  -0.0508**  -0.0347*  -0.0475**  -0.0795***  -0.0703***  -0.0707*** 
  (0.0211)  (0.0200)  (0.0188)  (0.0208)  (0.0184)  (0.0190) 
Candidates’  and  Municipalities’ 
Controls 
NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
             
Municipality Fixed Effects  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  1410  1410  1368  1410  1410  1368 
Adjusted R-squared  0.603  0.648  0.701  0.675  0.735  0.735 
Number of clusters  632  632  620  632  632  620 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio between valid ballots at the second round and eligible electors. Candidates’ controls include Candidates’ 
Education, Candidates’ Age, Female Candidates. Municipalities’ Controls include Population, Education, Employment, Percentage Pop≥65. In all 
regressions we control for year dummies. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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In sum, our estimation results strongly confirm the idea that electors are induced to go to vote 
when the electoral competition is high. However, we are not able to disentangle the direct effect of 
closeness  (due  to  the  fact  that  the  probability  of  affecting  results increases)  from  the  indirect effect 
deriving  from  the  mobilization  effort  provided  by  candidates  and  political  parties  and  from  social 
pressure. In fact, when candidates are in a close race, they have strong incentives to put forth effort and to 
invest  in  electoral  campaigns  in  order  to  convince  electors  to  vote  for  them.  Whereas  the  effect  of 
mobilization effort can be taken into account considering the electoral turnout in the first round, we are 
not able to control for the effort devoted by candidates in the two weeks intervening from the first to the 
second round. 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
5.1. Dealing with non-random selection: Heckman correction 
The sample we have used so far is a non-randomly selected sample of municipalities with more than 
15,000 inhabitants. As explained above, the second ballot is held only if none of the candidates obtains an 
absolute majority of votes in the first ballot. According to the data, about 42% of municipalities (1,057) 
elects the mayor at the first round. 
As shown by Heckman (1979), OLS estimates under these conditions could in principle produce 
inconsistent estimates. To correct for the fact that municipalities  holding a second round are a non-
randomly selected sample we use the two-step Heckman selection model. 
Firstly, we need to specify a selection equation in order to model the probability of going to the 
second round. We use the Number of Candidates at the first round as independent variable included in the 
selection equation but arguably not relevant for the outcome equation (only the two candidates obtaining 
more votes compete in the second round). The Number of Candidates presumably affects the dispersion 
of votes in the first round and should positively affect the probability of going to the second round, since 
it is more difficult that a single candidate obtains more than 50 percent of the votes. On the other hand, 
once we control for the percentage of votes obtained by the two leading candidates in the first round, the 
number of candidates in the first round should not affect the turnout in the second round. 
Estimation results of the Heckman selection model are reported in Table 4. In Panel A we report 
the outcome equation, in which the turnout (Valid II round) is put in relationship with the Electoral 
Margin, while in Panel B we report the results of the selection equation. We use a standard two-step 
estimation method. In the selection equation, in addition the Number of Candidates, we control for any 
variable that appears as an explanatory variable in the outcome equation. 
As expected, we find that the Number of Candidates positively affects the probability of being in 
the  sample  (significant  at  the  1  percent level). The  inverse Mills  ratio   is always  not  significantly 
different from zero, implying that there is no evidence of a sample selection bias and OLS estimates are 12 
 
consistent. This is confirmed by estimates reported in Panel A of Table 4, which are in line with the OLS 
estimates reported in Table 2: the coefficient on Electoral Margin is around -0.16/-0.20, with a t-stat 
always around 6 or greater. 
We have also estimated the Heckman Selection model using full maximum likelihood obtaining 
results very similar to those reported in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. Heckman Selection Model               
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout 
Panel A: Turnout             
             
Electoral Margin  -0.2309***  -0.1754***  -0.1877***  -0.2084***  -0.1670***  -0.1670*** 
  (0.0394)  (0.0261)  (0.0206)  (0.0319)  (0.0237)  (0.0241) 
             
Panel  B:  Selection  Equation 
(Second Round) 
           
# Candidates (I round)  0.2627***  0.1978***  0.4320***  0.2917***  0.4011***  0.5755*** 
  (0.0220)  (0.0519)  (0.0972)  (0.0250)  (0.0841)  (0.1211) 
Electoral Margin  -16.2142***  -96.9201***  -114.6131***  -17.1901***  -107.9374***  -114.5426*** 
  (0.6396)  (7.7906)  (12.0157)  (0.7388)  (10.5901)  (12.8416) 
             
Observations  2467  2464  2295  2467  2464  2294 
Censored  1057  1054  926  1057  1054  925 
Lambda  0.0076  0.0023  0.0005  0.0046  0.0163  0.0189 
S.E. Lambda  0.0064  0.0062  0.0061  0.0054  0.0069  0.0075 
Rho  0.1568  0.0420  0.0127  0.1109  0.3487  0.4066 
Notes: Two-step estimation method. Columns 1-6 replicate the estimates of columns 1-6 of Table 2. In columns 4-6 we include provincial fixed 
effects instead of municipality fixed effects (computationally more burdensome). In the selection equation we use as explanatory variable the 
Number of Candidates and any variables that appears as an explanatory variable in the outcome equation is also included in the selection equation. 
Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
5.2. Using a Proportional Dependent Variable Estimator 
As explained by Wooldridge (2002), since our dependent variable is a proportion and takes values from 0 
to 1, the linear model faces the same weaknesses as the linear probability model for a binary dependent 
variable. In order to deal with the fact that the dependent variable is a proportion, in this section we use 
the fractional logit model proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
9 
We replicate the   specifications of Table 2. Parameter estimati ons, performed by maximum 
likelihood, are reported in Table 5. To make easily comparable these estimates with OLS ones, we report 
marginal effects. We find that the Electoral Margin has a strong and significant impact on the percentage 
of valid ballots. The magnitude of the effects and the statistical significance levels are very similar to 
those emerging from OLS estimates. 
 
                                                       
9 We have also tried an alternative method – the beta regression model (see Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004) – 
obtaining very similar results. 13 
 
Table 5. Fractional Logit model. Marginal Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout  Turnout 
             
Electoral Margin  -0.1963***  -0.1810***  -0.1893***  -0.1842***  -0.1615***  -0.1708*** 
  (0.0253)  (0.0239)  (0.0235)  (0.0235)  (0.0211)  (0.0213) 
             
Observations  1410  1410  1367  1410  1410  1369 
Number of clusters  632  632  620  632  632  620 
Notes: Columns 1-6 replicate the estimates of columns 1-6 of Table 2. In columns 4-6 we include municipality fixed effects. Standard errors 
(corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  clusterized  at  the  municipality  level)  are  reported  in  parentheses.  The  symbols  ***  indicate  that  the 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
A possible alternative to the fractional logit model is to transform the dependent variable as a log-
odds ratio    ) 1 ( ln y y  , and estimate a linear regression model. In this case too, we find results that are 
consistent with OLS estimates (results are not reported and are available upon request). 
 
6. Electoral Closeness and Blank and Invalid Ballots   
Blank and voluntary invalid ballots represent voters’ choices that are difficult to interpret. From a cost-
benefit point of view, blank and voluntary invalid ballots seem irrational as a voter who shows up at the 
election poll incurs the cost of voting but when casting a blank or invalid ballot does not receive any 
benefit. However, when a civic duty component is considered, these types of vote may result consistent 
with a rational choice as the voter may obtain a benefit from casting a ballot and to show up on election 
day even if he does not obtain the benefits deriving from supporting a specific candidate or party (see 
Galatas, 2008).  
As explained in Section 2, the relationship between closeness and blank and invalid ballots could 
be either positive or negative. On the one hand, as the probability of casting the decisive vote is higher, 
the probability of casting a blank or invalid ballot should be lower in closer elections. On the other hand, 
closeness  may  increases  candidates'  and  social  pressure,  leading  electors  who  are  unconvinced  of 
competing candidates to cast a blank or invalid ballot. Finally, invalid ballots are also affected by the 
behavior of election officers. 
We firstly investigate the effect of closer elections on blank ballots and then turn our attention to 
invalid ballots. In Table 6 are reported estimation results obtained replicating the specifications estimated 
in Table 2, but considering as dependent variable the percentage of blank ballots in the second round. In 
all specifications we find that Electoral Margin produces a positive effect on the percentage of blank 
ballots (the effect is highly statistically significant), that is, when the race is closer individuals are less 
induced to cast a blank ballot. 
Our  findings  support  the  idea  that  the  behavior  of  electors  casting  blank  ballots  is  not  very 
different from the behavior of electors who abstain from going to the polls, so they react in the same way 
when the electoral race becomes closer. 
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Table 6. Blank Ballots in the second round and Closeness. OLS estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  (Blank)  (Blank)  (Blank)  (Blank)  (Blank)  (Blank) 
             
Electoral Margin  0.0100***  0.0085***  0.0065***  0.0094***  0.0071***  0.0059** 
  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0021)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024) 
Valid (I round)  0.0226***  0.0385***  0.0393***  0.0371***  0.0486***  0.0447*** 
  (0.0026)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0052)  (0.0052)  (0.0051) 
Votes First Two Cand. (I round)    -0.0160***  -0.0170***    -0.0133***  -0.0137*** 
    (0.0016)  (0.0015)    (0.0018)  (0.0018) 
Blank (I round)    0.1449***  0.1059***    0.1779***  0.1667*** 
    (0.0250)  (0.0191)    (0.0345)  (0.0337) 
Invalid (I round)    0.0155  0.0260*    0.0539*  0.0533* 
    (0.0150)  (0.0153)    (0.0282)  (0.0289) 
Candidates’  and  Municipalities’ 
Controls 
NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Municipality Fixed Effects  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  1410  1410  1368  1410  1410  1368 
Adjusted R-squared  0.385  0.465  0.557  0.566  0.622  0.618 
Number of clusters  632  632  620  632  632  620 
Notes:  The  dependent  variable  is  the  ratio  between  blank  ballots  at  the  second  round  and  eligible  electors.  Candidates’  controls  include 
Candidates’ Education, Candidates’ Age, Female Candidates. Municipalities’ Controls include Population, Education, Employment, Percentage 
Pop≥65. In all regressions we control for year dummies. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality 




Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  percentage  of  invalid  ballots.  In  Table  7  are  reported 
estimation results obtained considering as dependent variable the percentage of invalid ballots at the 
second round. We do not find any statistically significant impact of Electoral Margin on invalid ballots, 
although in some specifications the effect turns out to be positive and with a p-value of 0.13.-0.16. 
Therefore, electors who abstain to go to the polls and those casting a blank ballot behave similarly 
when the electoral competition gets harsher. Invalid ballots also show a similar pattern, but the effects are 
statistically insignificant. A potential higher effort provided by unbiased election officers in checking 
ballots in response to closeness, which would lead to a negative correlation between invalid ballots and 
the electoral margin – as shown in Aldashev and Mastrobuoni (2011) – does not seem to be sufficient to 
counterbalance the effects deriving from electors’ behavior. 
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Table 7. Invalid Ballots in the second Round and Closeness. OLS estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  (Invalid)  (Invalid)  (Invalid)  (Invalid)  (Invalid)  (Invalid) 
             
Electoral Margin  0.0048  0.0020  0.0010  0.0051  0.0018  0.0014 
  (0.0031)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0037)  (0.0036)  (0.0038) 
Valid (I round)  0.0113**  0.0356***  0.0389***  0.0150  0.0375***  0.0344*** 
  (0.0055)  (0.0055)  (0.0060)  (0.0097)  (0.0093)  (0.0104) 
Votes First Two Cand. (I round)    -0.0245***  -0.0253***    -0.0243***  -0.0248*** 
    (0.0024)  (0.0025)    (0.0029)  (0.0030) 
Blank (I round)    0.1341***  0.1070***    0.0966**  0.0776 
    (0.0245)  (0.0252)    (0.0470)  (0.0488) 
Invalid (I round)    0.1376***  0.1474***    0.0747  0.0752 
    (0.0471)  (0.0500)    (0.0500)  (0.0537) 
Candidates’  and  Municipalities’ 
Controls 
NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Municipality Fixed Effects  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  1410  1410  1368  1410  1410  1368 
Adjusted R-squared  0.375  0.462  0.472  0.481  0.533  0.531 
Number of clusters  632  632  620  632  632  620 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio between invalid ballots at the second round and eligible electors. Candidates’ controls include 
Candidates’ Education, Candidates’ Age, Female Candidates. Municipalities’ Controls include Population, Education, Employment, Percentage 
Pop≥65. In all regressions we control for year dummies. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality 
level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level. 
 
7. Non-Linearities in the Impact of Electoral Closeness  
In this section we investigate whether electoral closeness has a non-linear impact on valid, blank and 
invalid ballots. In fact, there are no particular reasons to expect a linear relationship. To analyze this 
aspect, we have classified our variable Electoral Margin in four categories (approximately corresponding 
to quartiles): the first group refers to cases in which at the first round the best performing candidate leads 
by less than 2%; the second one considers situations in which the electoral margin is higher than 2% but 
smaller than 5%; the third one refers to values of the electoral margin in the range 5% and 10%; the last 
case considers situations in which the best performing candidate leads by more than 10%. We build a 
dummy variables for each category. 
In Table 8 are reported estimation results using the most complete specification used in previous 
estimates (column 6 in Tables 2, 6 and 7), considering as dependent variable, alternatively, the percentage 
of valid ballots (column 1), the percentage of blank ballots (column 2) and the percentage of invalid 
ballots (column 3). We leave as reference category elections characterized by an electoral margin of less 
than 2%. 
Interestingly, as far as valid ballots are concerned (column 1), we find a statistically significant 
difference between the first and the second group (significant at 5% level). In addition, the percentage of 
valid ballots tends to furtherly reduce when the electoral margin reaches the range 5%-10% compared to 
electoral  contexts  characterized  by  smaller  margins  of  victory.  The  negative  impact  of  the  electoral 
margin is even stronger when the best performing candidate leads by more than 10%.  
Blank ballots (in column 2) seem to react more strongly when the electoral margin becomes 
particularly  high.  In  fact,  we  find  small  differences  between  the  first  two  groups,  estimated  rather 16 
 
imprecisely, while an increase in the percentage of blank ballots emerges when the electoral margin is 
higher than 10%. 
Estimation concerning invalid ballots show that they tend to increase when the margin increases 
from less than 2% to values in the range 2%-5%. However, further increases in the electoral margin do 
not  seem  to  produce  any  statistically  significant  effect  on  invalid  ballots  compared  to  the  reference 
category. 
 
Table 8. Non Linear Effects of Closeness on Valid, Blank and Invalid Ballots. Municipality Fixed Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 






       
2%<=Margin<5%  -0.0069**  0.0007**  0.0016** 
  (0.0034)  (0.0003)  (0.0006) 
5%<=Margin<10%  -0.0108***  0.0005  0.0009 
  (0.0031)  (0.0004)  (0.0006) 
Margin>=10%  -0.0262***  0.0011***  0.0008 
  (0.0034)  (0.0004)  (0.0006) 
Observations  1368  1368  1368 
Adjusted R-squared  0.750  0.619  0.534 
Number of clusters  620  620  620 
Notes: We replicate the estimates of column 6 of Tables 2, 6 and 8. 
 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, relying on the dual ballot system adopted in Italy for municipal elections in cities with more 
than 15,000 inhabitants, we have estimated the impact of electoral closeness on valid, blank and invalid 
ballots, using as a proxy of expected closeness at the second round the actual closeness at the first round 
between the two leading candidates. 
Using a very rich data set, providing information on the number of valid, invalid and blank ballots 
at the first and at the second round elections, on the number of people eligible to vote and on some 
candidates’ characteristics, we estimate several models with and without municipal fixed effects. We find 
that closeness strongly increases valid ballots and reduces blank ballots, suggesting that voters who cast a 
blank ballot react to closer elections similarly to those who decide to abstain from going to the poll. A 
decrease of 10 percentage points in the electoral margin produces an increase of about 2 percentage points  
of valid votes and a decrease of about 0.1 in the percentage of blank ballots. On the other hand, we do not 
find any statistically significant effect on the percentage of invalid ballots, maybe because of opposing 
effects deriving from the behavior of electors and of election officers: the former may be less inclined to 
cast an invalid ballot when the electoral margin shrinks, while the latter may increase their effort in 
checking valid preferences  so  increasing the number of invalid ballots when the risk of erroneously 
appointing the winner increases. 
  Our results are robust to the use of an Heckman selection model to tackle problems deriving from 
the fact that the second round only takes place if no candidate has obtained the majority of votes in the 17 
 
first round. The same findings emerge also when we estimate a fractional logit model to consider the 
nature of proportion of our dependent variables. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to accurately disentangle the direct effect of closeness (due to the 
higher  probability  of  affecting  the  electoral  outcome)  from  the  indirect  effect  deriving  from  the 
mobilization effort provided by candidates and political parties and from social pressure. In fact, while we 
can take into account mobilization campaigns taking place until the first round election, including among 
regressors the electoral turnout in the first round, we are not able to control for the effort devoted by 
candidates in the two weeks from the first to the second round. 
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